The Problems of the Civil-Military Relationship in Indonesia
Introduction
The Indonesian Armed Forces is a very unique in the sense that it was established not by the government, but the military created itself in 1945 from the members of militia trained by the Japanese. At that time, President Sukarno was reluctant to raise an army because he wanted to achieve independence peacefully[1]. This reluctance forced the military to elect its own Armed Forces Commander, Sudirman, a former schoolteacher turned battalion commander during the Japanese period. Sudirman, recognized the authority of President Sukarno as political leadership, but he also saw himself as guardian of the nation not as merely government soldier. The weakness of political and governmental institution at that time caused the government to lose control of the military, also convinced the officers to pursue their own policy. The guerilla war following the Dutch attack on 19 December 1948, gave Sudirman the opportunity to demonstrate the autonomy of the army. When the political leadership decided to surrender to the Dutch, Sudirman and his forces went to the jungle to fight a guerilla war. The history of the military establishment created long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. This essay will try to elaborate the civil-military relationship in post Suharto era and the future of this relationship based on the constitution and current political configurations in Indonesia. The use term of military and army will be exchangeable.
Post Suharto Era
In the post Suharto era, the civil-military relationship will be divided into 3 periods. The first period is the fall of Suharto in May 1998 - the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001,the second period is the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid – the implementation of the UU TNI (Undang-undang Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Law of the Indonesia National Armed Forces) and third the implementation of UU TNI 2004 to present.
Period 1998 – 2001.
In the first period, 1998-2001, the military suffered by the continuously pressure from the euphoria society and international forces, thus forced the military to abandon its political role. Anyhow, the officers departure from the military scene was not like the defeated troops in the war, but they consciously adjust their political role based on the challenges there were facing, so the move out orderly and gradually. While maintaining its self-perception as a guardian of the nation, a glue of the nation, military offered Four New Paradigms, first should not be always in front, second from occupying into influencing, third from direct to indirect influence, four role sharing with other component of the nation[2]. But because the political development did not allow, the military consciously abandon this political role. Actually, it’s a paradoxical thought, in one hand tried to abolish traditional political role, but in another hand still maintaining no faith in the civilian politics.
In this difficult period in 1999, young officers of the 1973 Class of the Military Academy launched the compilation book, Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI; Pemikiran Masa Depan (The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI)[3]. The authors of this book recognized that they are the members of the generation which received inheritance, but accused that the givers of inheritance failed to set a good example for the successor. The issues discussed namely Pancasila as the base of the state, the position of the Chief of the Armed Forces, TNI’s membership in the legislative body, and the military. Lots of the authors ideas met resist from the army, said that the ideas was not realistic. The strangest thing about the book, the most prominent member of the class, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did not contribute any article in the book, instead he published his own writing in a book titled Mengatasi Krisis, Menyelamatkan Reformasi[4] ( Overcoming Crisis, Saving the Reformation). He discussed the need for TNI to adjust itself to national life, the future of military’s political involvement and carefully observed the course of the debates about whether the military should discard the political role now or gradually. Consecutively TNI’s Commander in Chief stated on April 2000 that the main task of TNI is acting as the major component in the defense of the state, to foil any aggression and to guarantee the national interest[5].
The civil-military problem that emerged in the new democratic country is not something unusual. As Samuel Huntington stated in his book that the future problems in civil-military relations in new democracies are likely to come not from the military but from the civilian side of equation, their failures to promote economic development , maintain the law and order, weak political institution and ambitious political leaders who may enlist the military as their accomplices[6]. It had been clearly showed in the controversy surrounding the decision the People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR No VII/2000. The decision Assembly for the month of August 2000 stated that the TNI’s membership in the People’s Consultative Assembly at least through the year 2009. For some political observers, the decision to prolong the political role of the military even after the military itself discard that role only showed how actually the civilian politicians have an inferiority complex when dealing with the military. The other incident, such as President Abdurrahman Wahid intercession in the replacement of the TNI’s CinC and appointment of Agus Wirahadikusuma to lead the army, perceived as intrusion of civilian authority which went against the norm and regulations of the organization. The rejection by the Army caused Agus Wirahadikusuma lost his position, and President Abdurrahman Wahid ultimately lost his support base from the military and brought him down from his presidency.
Period 2001 – 2004.
In the second period, 2001-2004, Vice President Megawati who succeeded Wahid, tried to understand the military better, drew a lesson and avoided careless approach facing the military. She was carefully dealing with the military that almost forgot the rotation of the military leadership. The lesson she drawn, the military continues to be a political force and must be taken into account. Her stances clearly a proof of her consciousness and sensitivities toward TNI political power, which consecutively influenced the composition of her cabinet.
The tragedy September 11, 2001 probably became the turning point for the American attitude towards the political role of the military in the third world countries. In the respond of that disaster, President Bush declared Global War on Terror. Again, the world will be divided into the anti-terrorists and the pro-terrorists. It is almost the same as fifty years ago, when the world divided into anti-communists and pro-communists. It is possible in the name of war against terrorism America supported the involvement or the domination of the military in politics. The new tendency has arisen in the way US government attitude towards Pakistani military regime once General Musharraf declared his support for the Global War on Terror. If US government wanted to accelerate the fight towards Islamic Terrorists in Indonesia, than it was not impossible that the US wiould choose the military as a partner. The military’s political involvement would also bloc the Islamic hardliner party to spread their ideology further. But the US choose to have close cooperation with the police, while at the same time support the democratic administration under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, one of the prominent figure in the TNI reformation.
Period 2004-present.
In the third period, there was a general election in the 2004. This general election gave a good opportunity for the political parties to show their skill and knowledge. Again, the political parties competed for alliances with the former military officers. There was almost no party did not put the former military officers at the top of the legislative candidates list. Even in the presidential election, most of the candidates attempted to have former military as their partner. With the spreading bad news from the Parliament building such as money politics, the independence and the newspaper polls showed that the popularity of politicians declined and the military rose.
The result of the presidential election clearly showed that Yudhoyono, the former military officer, as the most popular candidate and became president to replace Megawati. To consider politicians and political parties in such condition, and the long history of military domination in Indonesia, it certainly not easy to put aside military from the national life. The problems is not only the politicians, but also the fundamental problems in the civil-military relations specifically in Indonesia such as the fragmented society, limited financial resources for the military, and the lack of civilians who have sufficient skill and knowledge to cope with the security and defense issues. In the active military duty, TNI’s CinC not only forbid the military to involve in politics but he also warned politicians not to drag military into politics any longer as happen in the past.
Even though military remains fulcrum in the political point of view, but military avoiding the day to day politics. This presence noticeable in the UU TNI which was implemented in December 2004. It stated that the process of integrating military headquarter into the Department of Defense will have to wait a suitable time in the future. The reason is the required politician maturity to avoid possibility of the military being used for the political purpose of the Minister of Defense. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono continues maintaining the TNI’s Reformation gradually and in the same time tried to foster the democratic institution without created turmoil in the military side.
The future of the professional military.
To tell the truth, most of the TNI;s reformation agenda today heading to the right direction. Some of the deficiencies TNI facing now must be considered as parts of the process which have to be crossed. Apart of that, there are some considerations to look closely in order to reach the goals, avoiding military’s political involvement and become fully professional military.
TNI has been long enough involved in the non military issues, such as political and economical life. In order to push the military to become profesional soldier, it will not an easy task and not as simple as what was imagined. In one hand, it is realized that the chance of Indonesia will have a professional military is big, mainly because TNI itself showing a strong tendency toward profesionalism, furthermore after the implementation of UU TNI. In the other hand, it clear there are some obstacles and challenges which could become a barrier for the creation of the profesional military if the obstacles and challenges is not properly addressed. In other word, Indonesia and specifically TNI, need to fulfill some requirement in the effort to develop profesional military. These requirements become sine qua non , externally or internally , in the macro and micro level, even in the longterm and shortterm solution, hence become a driving force and key factor which support a wheel of change towards profesional military.
The prerequisites namely economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. These prerequisites is not only non-dichotomic one to another but also it does not meant that one prerequisite is more important than the other. All prerequisites are considered to have the same degree of influence in supporting the creation of TNI’s profesionalism in the future. Legally, the TNI’s reformation become profesional has been completed, but in the reality still different. It is the Indonesian military culture which always believes what is right and what is wrong, a culture that was shaped a decades ago. It will requires time to adjust to the latest development in the spirit of military reform.
Beyond the military jurisdiction, there are three main points - which could be hindered the creation of profesional military - to be remembered. Firstly; the politicization of the military by the elite politicians, secondly; the absence of wish by political decision makers to truly understand the various law that regulate the problem of national defence, and thirdly; the decline of political stance of the public regarding the political role of military as a result of the public frustration at civilian politicians[7]. These three main points have significant influence for the TNI. These civil–military relationship problems different compare to what happen in US. In Indonesia, the politicians continously try to get the military support for the benefit of their party, while according to Nielsen, in the US the politicians and civilians worry about military involvement in the decision making process[8]. She said, there are two ways in which military participation in use-of-force decision making could affect the future of the military profession, first; it could adversely impact on future interaction betwen political leaders and military officers and second; more speculatively, it could bring into question the miltary’s jurisdiction itself by shaping the scope of what is thought to be legitimate professional work.
For the Indonesian people outside the military, its time to understand the mind behind the dynamic thought on TNI to abandon its traditional political role and move towards professional military. The notion that the military supposed to be the most powerful political forces, actually no more than a tool to prolong Suharto power. In this shed of light, military no more dominates politics, but only support the government. But the problem is, if the politicians cannot reach better compromise among themselves, then it will be very difficult to expect a stable government. The history tell us, during 53 years from 1945-1998, Indonesia only have 2 presidents, while for the last 5 (five) years from 1998-2004, Indonesia have 4 (four) presidents. The history also shows, when the existence of the nation at stake, the military will prop up as the savior of the nation.
Conclusion
The Indonesian Armed Forces is a unique in the sense that it was established itself in 1945 from the members of militia. The history of this establishment created long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. The fall of Suharto in 1998 and the implementation of the UU TNI in 2004 forced the military departure from political stage. The future of military professionalism will depend on the fulfillment of the prerequisites in the economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. While the maturity of the politicians will decide whether military will involve in politics or maintaining their profession.
Col Imam Edy Mulyono
[1] Salim Said, Suharto’s Armed Forces, English edition, (Sinar harapan, Jakarta, 2006), 2
[2] Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI Abad XXI, (Mabes ABRI, Jakarta,1999)11-13
[3] Agus Wirahadikusuma, MPA., et al.,Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI:Pemikiran Masa Depan.(Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1999). Title Transl.:The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI
[4] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mengatasi Krisis Menyelamatkan Reformasi (Puskap, Jakarta, 2000) 40. Title Transl.: Overcoming the Crisis and Saving the Reformation.
[5] The Press Release of the TNI’s CinC after the TNI Commander’s Call, Jakarta, April 20, 2000.
[6] Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platner (eds), Civil Military Relation and Democracy, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996) 14.
[7] Ikrar Nusa Bhakti,”Reformasi TNI dan Sejumlah Kendala” (Koran Tempo, Jakarta, Oct 6, 2003)Title Transl.:(Military Reforms and Some Obstacles)
[8] Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Rules of the Game? The Weinberg Doctrine and the American Use of Force,” in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds), The Future of the Army Profession, (McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, Boston,2005) 646.
Introduction
The Indonesian Armed Forces is a very unique in the sense that it was established not by the government, but the military created itself in 1945 from the members of militia trained by the Japanese. At that time, President Sukarno was reluctant to raise an army because he wanted to achieve independence peacefully[1]. This reluctance forced the military to elect its own Armed Forces Commander, Sudirman, a former schoolteacher turned battalion commander during the Japanese period. Sudirman, recognized the authority of President Sukarno as political leadership, but he also saw himself as guardian of the nation not as merely government soldier. The weakness of political and governmental institution at that time caused the government to lose control of the military, also convinced the officers to pursue their own policy. The guerilla war following the Dutch attack on 19 December 1948, gave Sudirman the opportunity to demonstrate the autonomy of the army. When the political leadership decided to surrender to the Dutch, Sudirman and his forces went to the jungle to fight a guerilla war. The history of the military establishment created long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. This essay will try to elaborate the civil-military relationship in post Suharto era and the future of this relationship based on the constitution and current political configurations in Indonesia. The use term of military and army will be exchangeable.
Post Suharto Era
In the post Suharto era, the civil-military relationship will be divided into 3 periods. The first period is the fall of Suharto in May 1998 - the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001,the second period is the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid – the implementation of the UU TNI (Undang-undang Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Law of the Indonesia National Armed Forces) and third the implementation of UU TNI 2004 to present.
Period 1998 – 2001.
In the first period, 1998-2001, the military suffered by the continuously pressure from the euphoria society and international forces, thus forced the military to abandon its political role. Anyhow, the officers departure from the military scene was not like the defeated troops in the war, but they consciously adjust their political role based on the challenges there were facing, so the move out orderly and gradually. While maintaining its self-perception as a guardian of the nation, a glue of the nation, military offered Four New Paradigms, first should not be always in front, second from occupying into influencing, third from direct to indirect influence, four role sharing with other component of the nation[2]. But because the political development did not allow, the military consciously abandon this political role. Actually, it’s a paradoxical thought, in one hand tried to abolish traditional political role, but in another hand still maintaining no faith in the civilian politics.
In this difficult period in 1999, young officers of the 1973 Class of the Military Academy launched the compilation book, Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI; Pemikiran Masa Depan (The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI)[3]. The authors of this book recognized that they are the members of the generation which received inheritance, but accused that the givers of inheritance failed to set a good example for the successor. The issues discussed namely Pancasila as the base of the state, the position of the Chief of the Armed Forces, TNI’s membership in the legislative body, and the military. Lots of the authors ideas met resist from the army, said that the ideas was not realistic. The strangest thing about the book, the most prominent member of the class, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did not contribute any article in the book, instead he published his own writing in a book titled Mengatasi Krisis, Menyelamatkan Reformasi[4] ( Overcoming Crisis, Saving the Reformation). He discussed the need for TNI to adjust itself to national life, the future of military’s political involvement and carefully observed the course of the debates about whether the military should discard the political role now or gradually. Consecutively TNI’s Commander in Chief stated on April 2000 that the main task of TNI is acting as the major component in the defense of the state, to foil any aggression and to guarantee the national interest[5].
The civil-military problem that emerged in the new democratic country is not something unusual. As Samuel Huntington stated in his book that the future problems in civil-military relations in new democracies are likely to come not from the military but from the civilian side of equation, their failures to promote economic development , maintain the law and order, weak political institution and ambitious political leaders who may enlist the military as their accomplices[6]. It had been clearly showed in the controversy surrounding the decision the People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR No VII/2000. The decision Assembly for the month of August 2000 stated that the TNI’s membership in the People’s Consultative Assembly at least through the year 2009. For some political observers, the decision to prolong the political role of the military even after the military itself discard that role only showed how actually the civilian politicians have an inferiority complex when dealing with the military. The other incident, such as President Abdurrahman Wahid intercession in the replacement of the TNI’s CinC and appointment of Agus Wirahadikusuma to lead the army, perceived as intrusion of civilian authority which went against the norm and regulations of the organization. The rejection by the Army caused Agus Wirahadikusuma lost his position, and President Abdurrahman Wahid ultimately lost his support base from the military and brought him down from his presidency.
Period 2001 – 2004.
In the second period, 2001-2004, Vice President Megawati who succeeded Wahid, tried to understand the military better, drew a lesson and avoided careless approach facing the military. She was carefully dealing with the military that almost forgot the rotation of the military leadership. The lesson she drawn, the military continues to be a political force and must be taken into account. Her stances clearly a proof of her consciousness and sensitivities toward TNI political power, which consecutively influenced the composition of her cabinet.
The tragedy September 11, 2001 probably became the turning point for the American attitude towards the political role of the military in the third world countries. In the respond of that disaster, President Bush declared Global War on Terror. Again, the world will be divided into the anti-terrorists and the pro-terrorists. It is almost the same as fifty years ago, when the world divided into anti-communists and pro-communists. It is possible in the name of war against terrorism America supported the involvement or the domination of the military in politics. The new tendency has arisen in the way US government attitude towards Pakistani military regime once General Musharraf declared his support for the Global War on Terror. If US government wanted to accelerate the fight towards Islamic Terrorists in Indonesia, than it was not impossible that the US wiould choose the military as a partner. The military’s political involvement would also bloc the Islamic hardliner party to spread their ideology further. But the US choose to have close cooperation with the police, while at the same time support the democratic administration under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, one of the prominent figure in the TNI reformation.
Period 2004-present.
In the third period, there was a general election in the 2004. This general election gave a good opportunity for the political parties to show their skill and knowledge. Again, the political parties competed for alliances with the former military officers. There was almost no party did not put the former military officers at the top of the legislative candidates list. Even in the presidential election, most of the candidates attempted to have former military as their partner. With the spreading bad news from the Parliament building such as money politics, the independence and the newspaper polls showed that the popularity of politicians declined and the military rose.
The result of the presidential election clearly showed that Yudhoyono, the former military officer, as the most popular candidate and became president to replace Megawati. To consider politicians and political parties in such condition, and the long history of military domination in Indonesia, it certainly not easy to put aside military from the national life. The problems is not only the politicians, but also the fundamental problems in the civil-military relations specifically in Indonesia such as the fragmented society, limited financial resources for the military, and the lack of civilians who have sufficient skill and knowledge to cope with the security and defense issues. In the active military duty, TNI’s CinC not only forbid the military to involve in politics but he also warned politicians not to drag military into politics any longer as happen in the past.
Even though military remains fulcrum in the political point of view, but military avoiding the day to day politics. This presence noticeable in the UU TNI which was implemented in December 2004. It stated that the process of integrating military headquarter into the Department of Defense will have to wait a suitable time in the future. The reason is the required politician maturity to avoid possibility of the military being used for the political purpose of the Minister of Defense. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono continues maintaining the TNI’s Reformation gradually and in the same time tried to foster the democratic institution without created turmoil in the military side.
The future of the professional military.
To tell the truth, most of the TNI;s reformation agenda today heading to the right direction. Some of the deficiencies TNI facing now must be considered as parts of the process which have to be crossed. Apart of that, there are some considerations to look closely in order to reach the goals, avoiding military’s political involvement and become fully professional military.
TNI has been long enough involved in the non military issues, such as political and economical life. In order to push the military to become profesional soldier, it will not an easy task and not as simple as what was imagined. In one hand, it is realized that the chance of Indonesia will have a professional military is big, mainly because TNI itself showing a strong tendency toward profesionalism, furthermore after the implementation of UU TNI. In the other hand, it clear there are some obstacles and challenges which could become a barrier for the creation of the profesional military if the obstacles and challenges is not properly addressed. In other word, Indonesia and specifically TNI, need to fulfill some requirement in the effort to develop profesional military. These requirements become sine qua non , externally or internally , in the macro and micro level, even in the longterm and shortterm solution, hence become a driving force and key factor which support a wheel of change towards profesional military.
The prerequisites namely economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. These prerequisites is not only non-dichotomic one to another but also it does not meant that one prerequisite is more important than the other. All prerequisites are considered to have the same degree of influence in supporting the creation of TNI’s profesionalism in the future. Legally, the TNI’s reformation become profesional has been completed, but in the reality still different. It is the Indonesian military culture which always believes what is right and what is wrong, a culture that was shaped a decades ago. It will requires time to adjust to the latest development in the spirit of military reform.
Beyond the military jurisdiction, there are three main points - which could be hindered the creation of profesional military - to be remembered. Firstly; the politicization of the military by the elite politicians, secondly; the absence of wish by political decision makers to truly understand the various law that regulate the problem of national defence, and thirdly; the decline of political stance of the public regarding the political role of military as a result of the public frustration at civilian politicians[7]. These three main points have significant influence for the TNI. These civil–military relationship problems different compare to what happen in US. In Indonesia, the politicians continously try to get the military support for the benefit of their party, while according to Nielsen, in the US the politicians and civilians worry about military involvement in the decision making process[8]. She said, there are two ways in which military participation in use-of-force decision making could affect the future of the military profession, first; it could adversely impact on future interaction betwen political leaders and military officers and second; more speculatively, it could bring into question the miltary’s jurisdiction itself by shaping the scope of what is thought to be legitimate professional work.
For the Indonesian people outside the military, its time to understand the mind behind the dynamic thought on TNI to abandon its traditional political role and move towards professional military. The notion that the military supposed to be the most powerful political forces, actually no more than a tool to prolong Suharto power. In this shed of light, military no more dominates politics, but only support the government. But the problem is, if the politicians cannot reach better compromise among themselves, then it will be very difficult to expect a stable government. The history tell us, during 53 years from 1945-1998, Indonesia only have 2 presidents, while for the last 5 (five) years from 1998-2004, Indonesia have 4 (four) presidents. The history also shows, when the existence of the nation at stake, the military will prop up as the savior of the nation.
Conclusion
The Indonesian Armed Forces is a unique in the sense that it was established itself in 1945 from the members of militia. The history of this establishment created long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. The fall of Suharto in 1998 and the implementation of the UU TNI in 2004 forced the military departure from political stage. The future of military professionalism will depend on the fulfillment of the prerequisites in the economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. While the maturity of the politicians will decide whether military will involve in politics or maintaining their profession.
Col Imam Edy Mulyono
[1] Salim Said, Suharto’s Armed Forces, English edition, (Sinar harapan, Jakarta, 2006), 2
[2] Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI Abad XXI, (Mabes ABRI, Jakarta,1999)11-13
[3] Agus Wirahadikusuma, MPA., et al.,Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI:Pemikiran Masa Depan.(Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1999). Title Transl.:The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI
[4] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mengatasi Krisis Menyelamatkan Reformasi (Puskap, Jakarta, 2000) 40. Title Transl.: Overcoming the Crisis and Saving the Reformation.
[5] The Press Release of the TNI’s CinC after the TNI Commander’s Call, Jakarta, April 20, 2000.
[6] Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platner (eds), Civil Military Relation and Democracy, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996) 14.
[7] Ikrar Nusa Bhakti,”Reformasi TNI dan Sejumlah Kendala” (Koran Tempo, Jakarta, Oct 6, 2003)Title Transl.:(Military Reforms and Some Obstacles)
[8] Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Rules of the Game? The Weinberg Doctrine and the American Use of Force,” in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds), The Future of the Army Profession, (McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, Boston,2005) 646.
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