Saturday, December 22, 2007
The Problems of the Civil-Military Relationship in Indonesia
The Problems of the Civil-Military Relationship in Indonesia
Introduction
The Indonesian Armed Forces is a very unique in the sense that it was established not by the government, but the military created itself in 1945 from the members of militia trained by the Japanese. At that time, President Sukarno was reluctant to raise an army because he wanted to achieve independence peacefully[1]. This reluctance forced the military to elect its own Armed Forces Commander, Sudirman, a former schoolteacher turned battalion commander during the Japanese period. Sudirman, recognized the authority of President Sukarno as political leadership, but he also saw himself as guardian of the nation not as merely government soldier. The weakness of political and governmental institution at that time caused the government to lose control of the military, also convinced the officers to pursue their own policy. The guerilla war following the Dutch attack on 19 December 1948, gave Sudirman the opportunity to demonstrate the autonomy of the army. When the political leadership decided to surrender to the Dutch, Sudirman and his forces went to the jungle to fight a guerilla war. The history of the military establishment created long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. This essay will try to elaborate the civil-military relationship in post Suharto era and the future of this relationship based on the constitution and current political configurations in Indonesia. The use term of military and army will be exchangeable.
Post Suharto Era
In the post Suharto era, the civil-military relationship will be divided into 3 periods. The first period is the fall of Suharto in May 1998 - the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001,the second period is the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid – the implementation of the UU TNI (Undang-undang Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Law of the Indonesia National Armed Forces) and third the implementation of UU TNI 2004 to present.
Period 1998 – 2001.
In the first period, 1998-2001, the military suffered by the continuously pressure from the euphoria society and international forces, thus forced the military to abandon its political role. Anyhow, the officers departure from the military scene was not like the defeated troops in the war, but they consciously adjust their political role based on the challenges there were facing, so the move out orderly and gradually. While maintaining its self-perception as a guardian of the nation, a glue of the nation, military offered Four New Paradigms, first should not be always in front, second from occupying into influencing, third from direct to indirect influence, four role sharing with other component of the nation[2]. But because the political development did not allow, the military consciously abandon this political role. Actually, it’s a paradoxical thought, in one hand tried to abolish traditional political role, but in another hand still maintaining no faith in the civilian politics.
In this difficult period in 1999, young officers of the 1973 Class of the Military Academy launched the compilation book, Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI; Pemikiran Masa Depan (The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI)[3]. The authors of this book recognized that they are the members of the generation which received inheritance, but accused that the givers of inheritance failed to set a good example for the successor. The issues discussed namely Pancasila as the base of the state, the position of the Chief of the Armed Forces, TNI’s membership in the legislative body, and the military. Lots of the authors ideas met resist from the army, said that the ideas was not realistic. The strangest thing about the book, the most prominent member of the class, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did not contribute any article in the book, instead he published his own writing in a book titled Mengatasi Krisis, Menyelamatkan Reformasi[4] ( Overcoming Crisis, Saving the Reformation). He discussed the need for TNI to adjust itself to national life, the future of military’s political involvement and carefully observed the course of the debates about whether the military should discard the political role now or gradually. Consecutively TNI’s Commander in Chief stated on April 2000 that the main task of TNI is acting as the major component in the defense of the state, to foil any aggression and to guarantee the national interest[5].
The civil-military problem that emerged in the new democratic country is not something unusual. As Samuel Huntington stated in his book that the future problems in civil-military relations in new democracies are likely to come not from the military but from the civilian side of equation, their failures to promote economic development , maintain the law and order, weak political institution and ambitious political leaders who may enlist the military as their accomplices[6]. It had been clearly showed in the controversy surrounding the decision the People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR No VII/2000. The decision Assembly for the month of August 2000 stated that the TNI’s membership in the People’s Consultative Assembly at least through the year 2009. For some political observers, the decision to prolong the political role of the military even after the military itself discard that role only showed how actually the civilian politicians have an inferiority complex when dealing with the military. The other incident, such as President Abdurrahman Wahid intercession in the replacement of the TNI’s CinC and appointment of Agus Wirahadikusuma to lead the army, perceived as intrusion of civilian authority which went against the norm and regulations of the organization. The rejection by the Army caused Agus Wirahadikusuma lost his position, and President Abdurrahman Wahid ultimately lost his support base from the military and brought him down from his presidency.
Period 2001 – 2004.
In the second period, 2001-2004, Vice President Megawati who succeeded Wahid, tried to understand the military better, drew a lesson and avoided careless approach facing the military. She was carefully dealing with the military that almost forgot the rotation of the military leadership. The lesson she drawn, the military continues to be a political force and must be taken into account. Her stances clearly a proof of her consciousness and sensitivities toward TNI political power, which consecutively influenced the composition of her cabinet.
The tragedy September 11, 2001 probably became the turning point for the American attitude towards the political role of the military in the third world countries. In the respond of that disaster, President Bush declared Global War on Terror. Again, the world will be divided into the anti-terrorists and the pro-terrorists. It is almost the same as fifty years ago, when the world divided into anti-communists and pro-communists. It is possible in the name of war against terrorism America supported the involvement or the domination of the military in politics. The new tendency has arisen in the way US government attitude towards Pakistani military regime once General Musharraf declared his support for the Global War on Terror. If US government wanted to accelerate the fight towards Islamic Terrorists in Indonesia, than it was not impossible that the US wiould choose the military as a partner. The military’s political involvement would also bloc the Islamic hardliner party to spread their ideology further. But the US choose to have close cooperation with the police, while at the same time support the democratic administration under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, one of the prominent figure in the TNI reformation.
Period 2004-present.
In the third period, there was a general election in the 2004. This general election gave a good opportunity for the political parties to show their skill and knowledge. Again, the political parties competed for alliances with the former military officers. There was almost no party did not put the former military officers at the top of the legislative candidates list. Even in the presidential election, most of the candidates attempted to have former military as their partner. With the spreading bad news from the Parliament building such as money politics, the independence and the newspaper polls showed that the popularity of politicians declined and the military rose.
The result of the presidential election clearly showed that Yudhoyono, the former military officer, as the most popular candidate and became president to replace Megawati. To consider politicians and political parties in such condition, and the long history of military domination in Indonesia, it certainly not easy to put aside military from the national life. The problems is not only the politicians, but also the fundamental problems in the civil-military relations specifically in Indonesia such as the fragmented society, limited financial resources for the military, and the lack of civilians who have sufficient skill and knowledge to cope with the security and defense issues. In the active military duty, TNI’s CinC not only forbid the military to involve in politics but he also warned politicians not to drag military into politics any longer as happen in the past.
Even though military remains fulcrum in the political point of view, but military avoiding the day to day politics. This presence noticeable in the UU TNI which was implemented in December 2004. It stated that the process of integrating military headquarter into the Department of Defense will have to wait a suitable time in the future. The reason is the required politician maturity to avoid possibility of the military being used for the political purpose of the Minister of Defense. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono continues maintaining the TNI’s Reformation gradually and in the same time tried to foster the democratic institution without created turmoil in the military side.
The future of the professional military.
To tell the truth, most of the TNI;s reformation agenda today heading to the right direction. Some of the deficiencies TNI facing now must be considered as parts of the process which have to be crossed. Apart of that, there are some considerations to look closely in order to reach the goals, avoiding military’s political involvement and become fully professional military.
TNI has been long enough involved in the non military issues, such as political and economical life. In order to push the military to become profesional soldier, it will not an easy task and not as simple as what was imagined. In one hand, it is realized that the chance of Indonesia will have a professional military is big, mainly because TNI itself showing a strong tendency toward profesionalism, furthermore after the implementation of UU TNI. In the other hand, it clear there are some obstacles and challenges which could become a barrier for the creation of the profesional military if the obstacles and challenges is not properly addressed. In other word, Indonesia and specifically TNI, need to fulfill some requirement in the effort to develop profesional military. These requirements become sine qua non , externally or internally , in the macro and micro level, even in the longterm and shortterm solution, hence become a driving force and key factor which support a wheel of change towards profesional military.
The prerequisites namely economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. These prerequisites is not only non-dichotomic one to another but also it does not meant that one prerequisite is more important than the other. All prerequisites are considered to have the same degree of influence in supporting the creation of TNI’s profesionalism in the future. Legally, the TNI’s reformation become profesional has been completed, but in the reality still different. It is the Indonesian military culture which always believes what is right and what is wrong, a culture that was shaped a decades ago. It will requires time to adjust to the latest development in the spirit of military reform.
Beyond the military jurisdiction, there are three main points - which could be hindered the creation of profesional military - to be remembered. Firstly; the politicization of the military by the elite politicians, secondly; the absence of wish by political decision makers to truly understand the various law that regulate the problem of national defence, and thirdly; the decline of political stance of the public regarding the political role of military as a result of the public frustration at civilian politicians[7]. These three main points have significant influence for the TNI. These civil–military relationship problems different compare to what happen in US. In Indonesia, the politicians continously try to get the military support for the benefit of their party, while according to Nielsen, in the US the politicians and civilians worry about military involvement in the decision making process[8]. She said, there are two ways in which military participation in use-of-force decision making could affect the future of the military profession, first; it could adversely impact on future interaction betwen political leaders and military officers and second; more speculatively, it could bring into question the miltary’s jurisdiction itself by shaping the scope of what is thought to be legitimate professional work.
For the Indonesian people outside the military, its time to understand the mind behind the dynamic thought on TNI to abandon its traditional political role and move towards professional military. The notion that the military supposed to be the most powerful political forces, actually no more than a tool to prolong Suharto power. In this shed of light, military no more dominates politics, but only support the government. But the problem is, if the politicians cannot reach better compromise among themselves, then it will be very difficult to expect a stable government. The history tell us, during 53 years from 1945-1998, Indonesia only have 2 presidents, while for the last 5 (five) years from 1998-2004, Indonesia have 4 (four) presidents. The history also shows, when the existence of the nation at stake, the military will prop up as the savior of the nation.
Conclusion
The Indonesian Armed Forces is a unique in the sense that it was established itself in 1945 from the members of militia. The history of this establishment created long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. The fall of Suharto in 1998 and the implementation of the UU TNI in 2004 forced the military departure from political stage. The future of military professionalism will depend on the fulfillment of the prerequisites in the economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. While the maturity of the politicians will decide whether military will involve in politics or maintaining their profession.
Col Imam Edy Mulyono
[1] Salim Said, Suharto’s Armed Forces, English edition, (Sinar harapan, Jakarta, 2006), 2
[2] Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI Abad XXI, (Mabes ABRI, Jakarta,1999)11-13
[3] Agus Wirahadikusuma, MPA., et al.,Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI:Pemikiran Masa Depan.(Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1999). Title Transl.:The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI
[4] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mengatasi Krisis Menyelamatkan Reformasi (Puskap, Jakarta, 2000) 40. Title Transl.: Overcoming the Crisis and Saving the Reformation.
[5] The Press Release of the TNI’s CinC after the TNI Commander’s Call, Jakarta, April 20, 2000.
[6] Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platner (eds), Civil Military Relation and Democracy, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996) 14.
[7] Ikrar Nusa Bhakti,”Reformasi TNI dan Sejumlah Kendala” (Koran Tempo, Jakarta, Oct 6, 2003)Title Transl.:(Military Reforms and Some Obstacles)
[8] Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Rules of the Game? The Weinberg Doctrine and the American Use of Force,” in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds), The Future of the Army Profession, (McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, Boston,2005) 646.
Introduction
The Indonesian Armed Forces is a very unique in the sense that it was established not by the government, but the military created itself in 1945 from the members of militia trained by the Japanese. At that time, President Sukarno was reluctant to raise an army because he wanted to achieve independence peacefully[1]. This reluctance forced the military to elect its own Armed Forces Commander, Sudirman, a former schoolteacher turned battalion commander during the Japanese period. Sudirman, recognized the authority of President Sukarno as political leadership, but he also saw himself as guardian of the nation not as merely government soldier. The weakness of political and governmental institution at that time caused the government to lose control of the military, also convinced the officers to pursue their own policy. The guerilla war following the Dutch attack on 19 December 1948, gave Sudirman the opportunity to demonstrate the autonomy of the army. When the political leadership decided to surrender to the Dutch, Sudirman and his forces went to the jungle to fight a guerilla war. The history of the military establishment created long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. This essay will try to elaborate the civil-military relationship in post Suharto era and the future of this relationship based on the constitution and current political configurations in Indonesia. The use term of military and army will be exchangeable.
Post Suharto Era
In the post Suharto era, the civil-military relationship will be divided into 3 periods. The first period is the fall of Suharto in May 1998 - the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001,the second period is the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid – the implementation of the UU TNI (Undang-undang Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Law of the Indonesia National Armed Forces) and third the implementation of UU TNI 2004 to present.
Period 1998 – 2001.
In the first period, 1998-2001, the military suffered by the continuously pressure from the euphoria society and international forces, thus forced the military to abandon its political role. Anyhow, the officers departure from the military scene was not like the defeated troops in the war, but they consciously adjust their political role based on the challenges there were facing, so the move out orderly and gradually. While maintaining its self-perception as a guardian of the nation, a glue of the nation, military offered Four New Paradigms, first should not be always in front, second from occupying into influencing, third from direct to indirect influence, four role sharing with other component of the nation[2]. But because the political development did not allow, the military consciously abandon this political role. Actually, it’s a paradoxical thought, in one hand tried to abolish traditional political role, but in another hand still maintaining no faith in the civilian politics.
In this difficult period in 1999, young officers of the 1973 Class of the Military Academy launched the compilation book, Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI; Pemikiran Masa Depan (The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI)[3]. The authors of this book recognized that they are the members of the generation which received inheritance, but accused that the givers of inheritance failed to set a good example for the successor. The issues discussed namely Pancasila as the base of the state, the position of the Chief of the Armed Forces, TNI’s membership in the legislative body, and the military. Lots of the authors ideas met resist from the army, said that the ideas was not realistic. The strangest thing about the book, the most prominent member of the class, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did not contribute any article in the book, instead he published his own writing in a book titled Mengatasi Krisis, Menyelamatkan Reformasi[4] ( Overcoming Crisis, Saving the Reformation). He discussed the need for TNI to adjust itself to national life, the future of military’s political involvement and carefully observed the course of the debates about whether the military should discard the political role now or gradually. Consecutively TNI’s Commander in Chief stated on April 2000 that the main task of TNI is acting as the major component in the defense of the state, to foil any aggression and to guarantee the national interest[5].
The civil-military problem that emerged in the new democratic country is not something unusual. As Samuel Huntington stated in his book that the future problems in civil-military relations in new democracies are likely to come not from the military but from the civilian side of equation, their failures to promote economic development , maintain the law and order, weak political institution and ambitious political leaders who may enlist the military as their accomplices[6]. It had been clearly showed in the controversy surrounding the decision the People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR No VII/2000. The decision Assembly for the month of August 2000 stated that the TNI’s membership in the People’s Consultative Assembly at least through the year 2009. For some political observers, the decision to prolong the political role of the military even after the military itself discard that role only showed how actually the civilian politicians have an inferiority complex when dealing with the military. The other incident, such as President Abdurrahman Wahid intercession in the replacement of the TNI’s CinC and appointment of Agus Wirahadikusuma to lead the army, perceived as intrusion of civilian authority which went against the norm and regulations of the organization. The rejection by the Army caused Agus Wirahadikusuma lost his position, and President Abdurrahman Wahid ultimately lost his support base from the military and brought him down from his presidency.
Period 2001 – 2004.
In the second period, 2001-2004, Vice President Megawati who succeeded Wahid, tried to understand the military better, drew a lesson and avoided careless approach facing the military. She was carefully dealing with the military that almost forgot the rotation of the military leadership. The lesson she drawn, the military continues to be a political force and must be taken into account. Her stances clearly a proof of her consciousness and sensitivities toward TNI political power, which consecutively influenced the composition of her cabinet.
The tragedy September 11, 2001 probably became the turning point for the American attitude towards the political role of the military in the third world countries. In the respond of that disaster, President Bush declared Global War on Terror. Again, the world will be divided into the anti-terrorists and the pro-terrorists. It is almost the same as fifty years ago, when the world divided into anti-communists and pro-communists. It is possible in the name of war against terrorism America supported the involvement or the domination of the military in politics. The new tendency has arisen in the way US government attitude towards Pakistani military regime once General Musharraf declared his support for the Global War on Terror. If US government wanted to accelerate the fight towards Islamic Terrorists in Indonesia, than it was not impossible that the US wiould choose the military as a partner. The military’s political involvement would also bloc the Islamic hardliner party to spread their ideology further. But the US choose to have close cooperation with the police, while at the same time support the democratic administration under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, one of the prominent figure in the TNI reformation.
Period 2004-present.
In the third period, there was a general election in the 2004. This general election gave a good opportunity for the political parties to show their skill and knowledge. Again, the political parties competed for alliances with the former military officers. There was almost no party did not put the former military officers at the top of the legislative candidates list. Even in the presidential election, most of the candidates attempted to have former military as their partner. With the spreading bad news from the Parliament building such as money politics, the independence and the newspaper polls showed that the popularity of politicians declined and the military rose.
The result of the presidential election clearly showed that Yudhoyono, the former military officer, as the most popular candidate and became president to replace Megawati. To consider politicians and political parties in such condition, and the long history of military domination in Indonesia, it certainly not easy to put aside military from the national life. The problems is not only the politicians, but also the fundamental problems in the civil-military relations specifically in Indonesia such as the fragmented society, limited financial resources for the military, and the lack of civilians who have sufficient skill and knowledge to cope with the security and defense issues. In the active military duty, TNI’s CinC not only forbid the military to involve in politics but he also warned politicians not to drag military into politics any longer as happen in the past.
Even though military remains fulcrum in the political point of view, but military avoiding the day to day politics. This presence noticeable in the UU TNI which was implemented in December 2004. It stated that the process of integrating military headquarter into the Department of Defense will have to wait a suitable time in the future. The reason is the required politician maturity to avoid possibility of the military being used for the political purpose of the Minister of Defense. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono continues maintaining the TNI’s Reformation gradually and in the same time tried to foster the democratic institution without created turmoil in the military side.
The future of the professional military.
To tell the truth, most of the TNI;s reformation agenda today heading to the right direction. Some of the deficiencies TNI facing now must be considered as parts of the process which have to be crossed. Apart of that, there are some considerations to look closely in order to reach the goals, avoiding military’s political involvement and become fully professional military.
TNI has been long enough involved in the non military issues, such as political and economical life. In order to push the military to become profesional soldier, it will not an easy task and not as simple as what was imagined. In one hand, it is realized that the chance of Indonesia will have a professional military is big, mainly because TNI itself showing a strong tendency toward profesionalism, furthermore after the implementation of UU TNI. In the other hand, it clear there are some obstacles and challenges which could become a barrier for the creation of the profesional military if the obstacles and challenges is not properly addressed. In other word, Indonesia and specifically TNI, need to fulfill some requirement in the effort to develop profesional military. These requirements become sine qua non , externally or internally , in the macro and micro level, even in the longterm and shortterm solution, hence become a driving force and key factor which support a wheel of change towards profesional military.
The prerequisites namely economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. These prerequisites is not only non-dichotomic one to another but also it does not meant that one prerequisite is more important than the other. All prerequisites are considered to have the same degree of influence in supporting the creation of TNI’s profesionalism in the future. Legally, the TNI’s reformation become profesional has been completed, but in the reality still different. It is the Indonesian military culture which always believes what is right and what is wrong, a culture that was shaped a decades ago. It will requires time to adjust to the latest development in the spirit of military reform.
Beyond the military jurisdiction, there are three main points - which could be hindered the creation of profesional military - to be remembered. Firstly; the politicization of the military by the elite politicians, secondly; the absence of wish by political decision makers to truly understand the various law that regulate the problem of national defence, and thirdly; the decline of political stance of the public regarding the political role of military as a result of the public frustration at civilian politicians[7]. These three main points have significant influence for the TNI. These civil–military relationship problems different compare to what happen in US. In Indonesia, the politicians continously try to get the military support for the benefit of their party, while according to Nielsen, in the US the politicians and civilians worry about military involvement in the decision making process[8]. She said, there are two ways in which military participation in use-of-force decision making could affect the future of the military profession, first; it could adversely impact on future interaction betwen political leaders and military officers and second; more speculatively, it could bring into question the miltary’s jurisdiction itself by shaping the scope of what is thought to be legitimate professional work.
For the Indonesian people outside the military, its time to understand the mind behind the dynamic thought on TNI to abandon its traditional political role and move towards professional military. The notion that the military supposed to be the most powerful political forces, actually no more than a tool to prolong Suharto power. In this shed of light, military no more dominates politics, but only support the government. But the problem is, if the politicians cannot reach better compromise among themselves, then it will be very difficult to expect a stable government. The history tell us, during 53 years from 1945-1998, Indonesia only have 2 presidents, while for the last 5 (five) years from 1998-2004, Indonesia have 4 (four) presidents. The history also shows, when the existence of the nation at stake, the military will prop up as the savior of the nation.
Conclusion
The Indonesian Armed Forces is a unique in the sense that it was established itself in 1945 from the members of militia. The history of this establishment created long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. The fall of Suharto in 1998 and the implementation of the UU TNI in 2004 forced the military departure from political stage. The future of military professionalism will depend on the fulfillment of the prerequisites in the economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. While the maturity of the politicians will decide whether military will involve in politics or maintaining their profession.
Col Imam Edy Mulyono
[1] Salim Said, Suharto’s Armed Forces, English edition, (Sinar harapan, Jakarta, 2006), 2
[2] Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI Abad XXI, (Mabes ABRI, Jakarta,1999)11-13
[3] Agus Wirahadikusuma, MPA., et al.,Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI:Pemikiran Masa Depan.(Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1999). Title Transl.:The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI
[4] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mengatasi Krisis Menyelamatkan Reformasi (Puskap, Jakarta, 2000) 40. Title Transl.: Overcoming the Crisis and Saving the Reformation.
[5] The Press Release of the TNI’s CinC after the TNI Commander’s Call, Jakarta, April 20, 2000.
[6] Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platner (eds), Civil Military Relation and Democracy, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996) 14.
[7] Ikrar Nusa Bhakti,”Reformasi TNI dan Sejumlah Kendala” (Koran Tempo, Jakarta, Oct 6, 2003)Title Transl.:(Military Reforms and Some Obstacles)
[8] Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Rules of the Game? The Weinberg Doctrine and the American Use of Force,” in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds), The Future of the Army Profession, (McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, Boston,2005) 646.
My Personal Theory of War
My Personal Theory of War
Introduction
Theory provides the ground framework within which professional discussion takes place. It gives boundary or corridor to facilitate communication and direction. Theory allows debate or improvement when a situation no longer be explained. In this paper, I would like to present my theory of war. Inspired by Clausewitz, I will try to elaborate on some topics including: the definition of war, the reasons for war, characteristics of war, and how wars are won and my personal projection of the future war.
What is war
From Sun Tzu in the east to Clausewitz in the west, many thinkers in history tried to define what the war is. Clausewitz -life in 19th century- tried to see the appropriate relationship between politics and war. When a friend sent him the problem for comment, he replied that it was impossible to draft a military operation without knowing the political condition or the relationship of each other states; war is not independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics in different means[1]. This definition of war is totally different compared to Sun Tzu – life circa 300 B.C.- who believed that war is a grave concern of the state, so it must be studied thoroughly[2]. He recognized that armed strife is not transitory aberration but a recurrent conscious act and therefore susceptible to rational analysis. From these two examples, we realize that the understanding of war is different from time to time, from generation to generation. The technological improvement, the ethical judgment and the interaction of values between nations create different meanings of war.
In my personal interpretation, war is a conflict between two or more parties involving a clash of will, an act of violent force to compel another to do our will, and an extension of the policy of each party. Parties could be nation states, or a group toward states. Examples of war between states are easy to find. Examples of war between a group towards state are not easy to find, but one example is when the Jews had war with Arab countries before 1948. The Six Days War in 1967 was no longer between Jews toward Arab countries but Israel toward Arabs countries because Israel had become a sovereign state. Compelling another to do our will means, that when another does our will, we win the war. This is clear as General Clark commented after the US-led air strikes toward former Yugoslavia. He said that achieving decisive political aims may not require decisive military results[3]. The air strike itself was implementation of the Allied policy toward former Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia complied with our will.
The cause of war
For centuries, there have been debates to find out the cause of war. Karl Max had a very articulated opinion that economic interest[4] caused war, although one can argue that Marx’s main theoretical preoccupation was with that particular phase of history characterized by fully developed capitalism. According to Liddell Hart,[5] the object of war is a better state of peace, even if only from one point of view. That is why according to him, it is very important to wage war with a constant regard to the peace we desire. This applies for both aggressor who invades and the nations who fight to defend themselves. It is interesting to know that according to Clausewitz[6], wars are fought to disarm the enemy’s country. He further explained that the enemy’s country should be covered to destroy their force, occupy the country and break their will to fight. And the most simply statement was made by Machiavelli,[7] whose stated that the aim of war must be to face an enemy in the field and to defeat him there.
But in my personal opinion, wars are fought to fulfill the national interest. We can find complex relationships within the national interest. There are constant struggles of ideas or smaller aspects of the national power to consider. When the friction of ideology, politics, economics, culture, religious, and military aspects reaches a certain level, a nation will decides that war will be beneficial. But when one or more of these aspects is endangered, then a party will try to avoid war, except for a nation in total war.[8], A total war mobilizes all resources, economic and military, supported by a society to engage the enemy in any geographic zone, or with any available weaponry. Sometimes in total war, a nation fights a scorched-earth campaign, even in one’s own territory.
Characteristics of war
There are many thoughts on the characteristic of war. Most strategists have their own list. Clausewitz’s characteristics of war include having an objective, friction and chaos, as instrument of policy, uncertainty, violent, and as the last resort. The complex development of international relationship, the economic interdependency between states, the marvelous progress of information and communication technology and the gap between the first world and underdeveloped countries are all new characteristics to add those we already know. In this paper, I will try to elaborate more on he characteristics that I believe will describe war.
The first characteristic describes who is fighting. War can involve nation-state actors also non-state actors. When we look at the history of the 19th century, only states waged war. The belligerent never means a people or group to challenge a state. That situation slowly changed when revolutionary wars or the wars of independence began to spread around the world as a result of a vacuum power left by WW II. The most significant turbulence happened when the US government declared war toward small organizations such as Al Qaeda. All of a sudden, we became convinced that the actor is not only a nation-state, but also non-states.
The second characteristic is war must have clear military objective(s), an end state and exit strategy. A military commander plans based on the objective(s) he has to achieve. He will derive the military objective from the end state politicians give him. When there is no clear objective, he will try to create an objective(s). In the war situation, a military commander could get lost in chaos if he does not have any objective. It is the responsibility of the military commander to tell the politician to give the end state and exit strategy because the commander realizes that military is an instrument of policy.
War is characterized by the dynamic of fog, friction and chaos. The fog of peace comes for a while before friction and chaos suddenly replace it. Everything becomes uncertainty, as war spreads violence everywhere. The only difference in war between the good and the bad actor is the moral basis. That is why the mistake of one soldier could create disaster for the whole division, such as incident in Abu Gharib, Iraq. This is the new war, and we have to be familiar with the circumstances surrounding it. The media is everywhere, the public freely gives comment on what happens, and the politicians give uncertainty. We life in a volatile, uncertain, critical, ambiguous (VUCA) situation, and we have to love it. As Gen. Anthony Zinni, former Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command, in 1997 refused to act when the White House asked him to draw Iraqi fire without proper order[9].
War causes pain everywhere. Casualties always happen, the only difference is the number between the two parties. It is coercive action that, if possible is to be avoided. It is the last resort, but sometimes useful. For example, in early 1980s, the Israel Air Force use the planes to destroy Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak I[10] and also attacked Yassir Arafat headquarters in Tunisia[11]. In the 1986, US took punitive action against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi by accurately hitting his tent[12].
All wars have both tangible and intangible costs. As long as the nation can bear the tangible cost and the public and the military are able to carry the intangible cost, there will be no problem to wage war. War uses paradoxical logic. The more difficult the objective to reach, the smaller the forces. The smaller the enemy, the more difficult to defeat them. As Clausewitz said, that war admittedly has its own grammar, but not its own logic.
To be successful, war must be supported by national will. National unity is deemed to be as essential requirement of victorious war. The unity and stability on home front and high morale in the army will assure remarkable acuity. When we already have this in hand, then we are ready to impose our will. When nations apply all the power they have, they may come to a point of uncertainty. That is why war involves deliberate planning and strategy because the fate of the nation is at stake. Most wars involve use of force or at least the threat of force. Lately, more and more politicians have depended on military threats to reach their political objectives. This is not wrong, but the more we use the military as a threat, the more diplomatic approaches become unused. Sometimes a political leader wants to change the status quo, in order to do that he uses military power to wage a war. He hopes that his action will produce a decision to become a winner or loser.
How wars are won
According to Sun Tzu[13], wars are won when we are able to frustrate enemy plans, break their alliances, create cleavages between their people or troops, infiltrate their intelligence and break their will to fight. Thus, the best master wins the war without battle. Only when the enemy can not be overcome by these means will the armed forces charge in to gain the victory in the shortest possible time, at the least possible cost in life and effort, and with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties. According to Clausewitz[14], to win a war, we have to use maximum force. It is a fallacy to believe an enemy can be defeated without much bloodshed, because war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. Another interesting opinion comes from Ralph Peters, a warmonger, who advocates wars of attrition. Specifically he mentions about the war in Iraq[15]; First, the war against religious terrorism is unquestionably a war of attrition- if one of the enemy is left alive or unimprisoned, he will continue trying to kill. Second, Operation Iraqi freedom, for all its dashing maneuvers, provides a new example of postmodern war of attrition.-one in which the casualties are overwhelming on one side.
I disagree that the use of force in modern warfare becomes the main tool to win the war. So, I support when General Wesley K. Clark stated that it is very important to use diplomacy backed by force[16], as he did with Serbia, even though not so many people support his statement. Actually, what he said was an adaptation from the old Sun Tzu or Clausewitz principles regarding how to wage the war. It is the will of the leader or the heart of the people who run the war. When the will to fight is diminished or disappears a war can easily be win.
Future war
My personal projection of the future of war is based on a prediction from the current trend wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Kosovo war. These wars basically were asymmetric wars. The Iraqi government had collapsed but the insurgence emerged. In Kosovo, the air strike destroyed all the radar and strategic military communication, but we never sent ground forces. In Afghanistan, the Taliban hid in the mountains or mixed with the tribes on the Pakistan border, so we could not defeat it. The Coalition Forces have difficulties destroying the Taliban even though we use better technology and equipment. When President Bush declared global war on terror, it became clear that the US had difficulties with their own power trying to destroy Al Qaeda. The US needed another coalition to crush the terrorist group.
When we look carefully to search for the cause of war, we will find there is no single cause of all these wars. The complexities of the causes make it impossible to distinguish each from the other. Is it because of the oil, military industrial complex, regional balance or anxieties that all the reserves in US dollar will be transferred to Euros and create financial chaos across the globe? Or is it because China is investing a lot of money trying to secure an energy deal they desperately need? Should we ask Huntington[17] if this is an example of a clash of the civilizations or ask Fukuyama[18] if only liberal democratic governments will be allowed on earth? No one knows the answer
What ever the reason, the super power has an obligation to maintain the world order and with or without the UN authority, move to compel the threat. With the political, economic, military, and technological dominance, it is clear there is not a single country in the world that will challenge the US. It is very important to synergize the national power to end war as soon as possible. While nations have always aimed in war to gain their objectives with the least cost, in future wars, achieving decisive political aims may not require decisive military results.
In my prediction, the future of war will more likely resemble Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. There will be environmental challenges such as valley, mountain, vegetation and villages and cities with peoples we do not want to harm. But we may limit the use of air strike due to environmental hazards, WMD, or NBC storage concerns. In addition, we have to obey any new law and be aware of journalist movement, or public outcry in carrying out our plans. Even with the best precision strike, we still need precision acquisition and identification on the ground. In this case, we still need people to observe and report back to us. Technology may help us with unmanned aerial vehicles, but it only reduces the size of this forward force, not omit it totally. As commander in the field, an officer must understand the process the transition from the political dynamic to a military dynamic.
Conclusion
Debates between theoreticians on the definition of war will continue, just as war will continue to visit our civilized world despite the different definitions of war. There is no single cause of war. However, the war we fight and the characteristics of war we face today slowly will evolve as we become more familiar with asymmetric war. The future of war may resemble the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. We can even expect war when the adversary is not major and the issues at stake do not threaten the survival of the nation. The features of this type of war will also capture public commentary -the reluctance to accept casualties, the horror of civilian casualties, and the impact of the media- are each driven by deeper factors. We have to avoid the use of force as the main tool to win the war. We have to maximize the use of diplomacy backed by force. The future of war may violate some principles of war- such as having a clear objective, unity of command, simple plan, economy of force, or surprise- but the basic principles are still the same. The future struggle on many fronts will depend on the success of the transition from the political dynamic to a military dynamic.
[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed edition, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, New Jersey,1984), 7
[2] Sun Tzu, The Art of War , translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, London,1971), 36
[3] Wesley K Clark, Waging Modern War (Public Affair, New York, 2001), 418-419
[4] Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (Macmillan, New York, 1973),281
[5] B.H. Liddel Hart, Strategy, second revised edition, ( New York,1991), 338
[6] Carl Von Clausewitz, 91
[7] Machiavelli in Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, New Jersey,1986),23
[8] Roy Gutnam and David Rieff, Editors, Crimes of War (W.W.Norton, New York, 1999), 355
[9] Dana Priest, ”The Mission: Waging War and Peace with America’s Military ( W.W. Norton, New York, 2003) 81
[10] BBC News, “On This Day, 1981: Israel Bomb Baghdad Nuclear Reactor,” available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/7/newsid_3014000/3014623.stm; accessed 18 September 2007.
[11]Wikipedia, the Free encyclopedia,” Operation Wooden Leg,” available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Wooden_Leg; accessed 18 September 2007.
[12] BBC News, “On This Day, 1986: US Launches Air Strike on Libya,” available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_3975000/3975455.stm; accessed 18 September 2007.
[13] Sun Tzu, 39
[14] Carl Von Clausewitz, 75
[15] Ralph Peters, In Praise of Attrition, Parameters, Vol. 34, No.2, Summer 2004, pp.24-32
[16]Wesley K Clark, 345-374
[17] Samuel P. Huntington, ”The Clash of Civilization?” in Conflict After the Cold War: Argument on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts( Longman, New York, 1989) 207
[18] Francis Fukuyama, ”The End of History?” in Conflict After the Cold War: Argument on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts( Longman, New York, 1989) 5
Introduction
Theory provides the ground framework within which professional discussion takes place. It gives boundary or corridor to facilitate communication and direction. Theory allows debate or improvement when a situation no longer be explained. In this paper, I would like to present my theory of war. Inspired by Clausewitz, I will try to elaborate on some topics including: the definition of war, the reasons for war, characteristics of war, and how wars are won and my personal projection of the future war.
What is war
From Sun Tzu in the east to Clausewitz in the west, many thinkers in history tried to define what the war is. Clausewitz -life in 19th century- tried to see the appropriate relationship between politics and war. When a friend sent him the problem for comment, he replied that it was impossible to draft a military operation without knowing the political condition or the relationship of each other states; war is not independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics in different means[1]. This definition of war is totally different compared to Sun Tzu – life circa 300 B.C.- who believed that war is a grave concern of the state, so it must be studied thoroughly[2]. He recognized that armed strife is not transitory aberration but a recurrent conscious act and therefore susceptible to rational analysis. From these two examples, we realize that the understanding of war is different from time to time, from generation to generation. The technological improvement, the ethical judgment and the interaction of values between nations create different meanings of war.
In my personal interpretation, war is a conflict between two or more parties involving a clash of will, an act of violent force to compel another to do our will, and an extension of the policy of each party. Parties could be nation states, or a group toward states. Examples of war between states are easy to find. Examples of war between a group towards state are not easy to find, but one example is when the Jews had war with Arab countries before 1948. The Six Days War in 1967 was no longer between Jews toward Arab countries but Israel toward Arabs countries because Israel had become a sovereign state. Compelling another to do our will means, that when another does our will, we win the war. This is clear as General Clark commented after the US-led air strikes toward former Yugoslavia. He said that achieving decisive political aims may not require decisive military results[3]. The air strike itself was implementation of the Allied policy toward former Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia complied with our will.
The cause of war
For centuries, there have been debates to find out the cause of war. Karl Max had a very articulated opinion that economic interest[4] caused war, although one can argue that Marx’s main theoretical preoccupation was with that particular phase of history characterized by fully developed capitalism. According to Liddell Hart,[5] the object of war is a better state of peace, even if only from one point of view. That is why according to him, it is very important to wage war with a constant regard to the peace we desire. This applies for both aggressor who invades and the nations who fight to defend themselves. It is interesting to know that according to Clausewitz[6], wars are fought to disarm the enemy’s country. He further explained that the enemy’s country should be covered to destroy their force, occupy the country and break their will to fight. And the most simply statement was made by Machiavelli,[7] whose stated that the aim of war must be to face an enemy in the field and to defeat him there.
But in my personal opinion, wars are fought to fulfill the national interest. We can find complex relationships within the national interest. There are constant struggles of ideas or smaller aspects of the national power to consider. When the friction of ideology, politics, economics, culture, religious, and military aspects reaches a certain level, a nation will decides that war will be beneficial. But when one or more of these aspects is endangered, then a party will try to avoid war, except for a nation in total war.[8], A total war mobilizes all resources, economic and military, supported by a society to engage the enemy in any geographic zone, or with any available weaponry. Sometimes in total war, a nation fights a scorched-earth campaign, even in one’s own territory.
Characteristics of war
There are many thoughts on the characteristic of war. Most strategists have their own list. Clausewitz’s characteristics of war include having an objective, friction and chaos, as instrument of policy, uncertainty, violent, and as the last resort. The complex development of international relationship, the economic interdependency between states, the marvelous progress of information and communication technology and the gap between the first world and underdeveloped countries are all new characteristics to add those we already know. In this paper, I will try to elaborate more on he characteristics that I believe will describe war.
The first characteristic describes who is fighting. War can involve nation-state actors also non-state actors. When we look at the history of the 19th century, only states waged war. The belligerent never means a people or group to challenge a state. That situation slowly changed when revolutionary wars or the wars of independence began to spread around the world as a result of a vacuum power left by WW II. The most significant turbulence happened when the US government declared war toward small organizations such as Al Qaeda. All of a sudden, we became convinced that the actor is not only a nation-state, but also non-states.
The second characteristic is war must have clear military objective(s), an end state and exit strategy. A military commander plans based on the objective(s) he has to achieve. He will derive the military objective from the end state politicians give him. When there is no clear objective, he will try to create an objective(s). In the war situation, a military commander could get lost in chaos if he does not have any objective. It is the responsibility of the military commander to tell the politician to give the end state and exit strategy because the commander realizes that military is an instrument of policy.
War is characterized by the dynamic of fog, friction and chaos. The fog of peace comes for a while before friction and chaos suddenly replace it. Everything becomes uncertainty, as war spreads violence everywhere. The only difference in war between the good and the bad actor is the moral basis. That is why the mistake of one soldier could create disaster for the whole division, such as incident in Abu Gharib, Iraq. This is the new war, and we have to be familiar with the circumstances surrounding it. The media is everywhere, the public freely gives comment on what happens, and the politicians give uncertainty. We life in a volatile, uncertain, critical, ambiguous (VUCA) situation, and we have to love it. As Gen. Anthony Zinni, former Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command, in 1997 refused to act when the White House asked him to draw Iraqi fire without proper order[9].
War causes pain everywhere. Casualties always happen, the only difference is the number between the two parties. It is coercive action that, if possible is to be avoided. It is the last resort, but sometimes useful. For example, in early 1980s, the Israel Air Force use the planes to destroy Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak I[10] and also attacked Yassir Arafat headquarters in Tunisia[11]. In the 1986, US took punitive action against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi by accurately hitting his tent[12].
All wars have both tangible and intangible costs. As long as the nation can bear the tangible cost and the public and the military are able to carry the intangible cost, there will be no problem to wage war. War uses paradoxical logic. The more difficult the objective to reach, the smaller the forces. The smaller the enemy, the more difficult to defeat them. As Clausewitz said, that war admittedly has its own grammar, but not its own logic.
To be successful, war must be supported by national will. National unity is deemed to be as essential requirement of victorious war. The unity and stability on home front and high morale in the army will assure remarkable acuity. When we already have this in hand, then we are ready to impose our will. When nations apply all the power they have, they may come to a point of uncertainty. That is why war involves deliberate planning and strategy because the fate of the nation is at stake. Most wars involve use of force or at least the threat of force. Lately, more and more politicians have depended on military threats to reach their political objectives. This is not wrong, but the more we use the military as a threat, the more diplomatic approaches become unused. Sometimes a political leader wants to change the status quo, in order to do that he uses military power to wage a war. He hopes that his action will produce a decision to become a winner or loser.
How wars are won
According to Sun Tzu[13], wars are won when we are able to frustrate enemy plans, break their alliances, create cleavages between their people or troops, infiltrate their intelligence and break their will to fight. Thus, the best master wins the war without battle. Only when the enemy can not be overcome by these means will the armed forces charge in to gain the victory in the shortest possible time, at the least possible cost in life and effort, and with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties. According to Clausewitz[14], to win a war, we have to use maximum force. It is a fallacy to believe an enemy can be defeated without much bloodshed, because war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. Another interesting opinion comes from Ralph Peters, a warmonger, who advocates wars of attrition. Specifically he mentions about the war in Iraq[15]; First, the war against religious terrorism is unquestionably a war of attrition- if one of the enemy is left alive or unimprisoned, he will continue trying to kill. Second, Operation Iraqi freedom, for all its dashing maneuvers, provides a new example of postmodern war of attrition.-one in which the casualties are overwhelming on one side.
I disagree that the use of force in modern warfare becomes the main tool to win the war. So, I support when General Wesley K. Clark stated that it is very important to use diplomacy backed by force[16], as he did with Serbia, even though not so many people support his statement. Actually, what he said was an adaptation from the old Sun Tzu or Clausewitz principles regarding how to wage the war. It is the will of the leader or the heart of the people who run the war. When the will to fight is diminished or disappears a war can easily be win.
Future war
My personal projection of the future of war is based on a prediction from the current trend wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Kosovo war. These wars basically were asymmetric wars. The Iraqi government had collapsed but the insurgence emerged. In Kosovo, the air strike destroyed all the radar and strategic military communication, but we never sent ground forces. In Afghanistan, the Taliban hid in the mountains or mixed with the tribes on the Pakistan border, so we could not defeat it. The Coalition Forces have difficulties destroying the Taliban even though we use better technology and equipment. When President Bush declared global war on terror, it became clear that the US had difficulties with their own power trying to destroy Al Qaeda. The US needed another coalition to crush the terrorist group.
When we look carefully to search for the cause of war, we will find there is no single cause of all these wars. The complexities of the causes make it impossible to distinguish each from the other. Is it because of the oil, military industrial complex, regional balance or anxieties that all the reserves in US dollar will be transferred to Euros and create financial chaos across the globe? Or is it because China is investing a lot of money trying to secure an energy deal they desperately need? Should we ask Huntington[17] if this is an example of a clash of the civilizations or ask Fukuyama[18] if only liberal democratic governments will be allowed on earth? No one knows the answer
What ever the reason, the super power has an obligation to maintain the world order and with or without the UN authority, move to compel the threat. With the political, economic, military, and technological dominance, it is clear there is not a single country in the world that will challenge the US. It is very important to synergize the national power to end war as soon as possible. While nations have always aimed in war to gain their objectives with the least cost, in future wars, achieving decisive political aims may not require decisive military results.
In my prediction, the future of war will more likely resemble Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. There will be environmental challenges such as valley, mountain, vegetation and villages and cities with peoples we do not want to harm. But we may limit the use of air strike due to environmental hazards, WMD, or NBC storage concerns. In addition, we have to obey any new law and be aware of journalist movement, or public outcry in carrying out our plans. Even with the best precision strike, we still need precision acquisition and identification on the ground. In this case, we still need people to observe and report back to us. Technology may help us with unmanned aerial vehicles, but it only reduces the size of this forward force, not omit it totally. As commander in the field, an officer must understand the process the transition from the political dynamic to a military dynamic.
Conclusion
Debates between theoreticians on the definition of war will continue, just as war will continue to visit our civilized world despite the different definitions of war. There is no single cause of war. However, the war we fight and the characteristics of war we face today slowly will evolve as we become more familiar with asymmetric war. The future of war may resemble the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. We can even expect war when the adversary is not major and the issues at stake do not threaten the survival of the nation. The features of this type of war will also capture public commentary -the reluctance to accept casualties, the horror of civilian casualties, and the impact of the media- are each driven by deeper factors. We have to avoid the use of force as the main tool to win the war. We have to maximize the use of diplomacy backed by force. The future of war may violate some principles of war- such as having a clear objective, unity of command, simple plan, economy of force, or surprise- but the basic principles are still the same. The future struggle on many fronts will depend on the success of the transition from the political dynamic to a military dynamic.
[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed edition, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, New Jersey,1984), 7
[2] Sun Tzu, The Art of War , translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, London,1971), 36
[3] Wesley K Clark, Waging Modern War (Public Affair, New York, 2001), 418-419
[4] Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (Macmillan, New York, 1973),281
[5] B.H. Liddel Hart, Strategy, second revised edition, ( New York,1991), 338
[6] Carl Von Clausewitz, 91
[7] Machiavelli in Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, New Jersey,1986),23
[8] Roy Gutnam and David Rieff, Editors, Crimes of War (W.W.Norton, New York, 1999), 355
[9] Dana Priest, ”The Mission: Waging War and Peace with America’s Military ( W.W. Norton, New York, 2003) 81
[10] BBC News, “On This Day, 1981: Israel Bomb Baghdad Nuclear Reactor,” available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/7/newsid_3014000/3014623.stm; accessed 18 September 2007.
[11]Wikipedia, the Free encyclopedia,” Operation Wooden Leg,” available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Wooden_Leg; accessed 18 September 2007.
[12] BBC News, “On This Day, 1986: US Launches Air Strike on Libya,” available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_3975000/3975455.stm; accessed 18 September 2007.
[13] Sun Tzu, 39
[14] Carl Von Clausewitz, 75
[15] Ralph Peters, In Praise of Attrition, Parameters, Vol. 34, No.2, Summer 2004, pp.24-32
[16]Wesley K Clark, 345-374
[17] Samuel P. Huntington, ”The Clash of Civilization?” in Conflict After the Cold War: Argument on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts( Longman, New York, 1989) 207
[18] Francis Fukuyama, ”The End of History?” in Conflict After the Cold War: Argument on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts( Longman, New York, 1989) 5
My goals in US Army War College
My goals in US Army War College
For nine weeks in Carlisle, I have thought about my goals while I study at the Army War College (AWC). I came here with my wife and my son. This is my third time attending a course in the USA, but it’s the first time for my family to come to the USA. Our Carlile Barrack’s sponsor picked us up at Harrisburg Airport and took us to Day’s Inn Hotel. We stayed three days in this hotel before we found a rental apartment close to the post. The first seven weeks, we had an orientation program with 42 other officers from different countries, and this last two weeks we split into seminar groups mixing with the US officers. Despite the busy activities in the orientation programs and our new seminar, there are two areas with goals I will try to focus on, professional and personal.
Professional Goals
Improve the Indonesian Army
I want to improve the Indonesian Army as a payback for what the army had already given me these last 27 years. I noticed several fields that I can improve when I go back to Indonesia. Of course, I will make some adjustments to make it applicable, but I will focus on organization, recruitment and civilians in the military.
The Indonesian Army organization now is in a great need to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in order to be able to cope with the current threat. It is a legacy of the Cold War whose structure and dislocation is based on the threat perception from that time. The rapid deployment forces must be ready to move to at least two different troubled spots on short notice. The forces should be restructured and moved closer to the predicted location, so the troubled spots can be contained giving sufficient time for the main forces to prepare to crush the enemy. The Indonesian Army also needs to spend money smarter. It must conduct thorough evaluation in all administration aspects, including how to control the money spent for housing allowances, how to eliminate dedicated vehicles for the officers and how to eliminate the unnecessary personal assistants.
We also need to improve the recruitment method in the Indonesia Army. What we have now is very orthodox. The recruitment location is in the military office and it’s open for a limited time only. In order to get the best candidate, it would be better if the recruitment locations were also placed in the malls, bus stations, airports or other busy places which attract the youth. The recruitment personnel also need to put advertisements in all available media, such as television, magazines, billboards and newspapers.
To improve the army, we also need committed civilians working in the military unit. Officially, civilians are complementary for the military. But in reality, the military feels it difficult to accept the civilian. So, we have to introduce a new culture working together hand in hand. On the military side, they must be ready to accept the civilian and put them in suitable positions, while on the civilian side, they must be able to show their capability and commitment, and at the same time, learn the army culture.
Improve Indonesian Army War College
The Indonesian Army War College inaugural class began this year. The first batch of officers started in March. The Command and General Staff College has the responsibility to run the course and to prepare the faculty. Most of the lectures come from guest speakers from different institutions. The students are comprised of senior colonels or junior flag officers. All of these officers are projected to get their promotion soon after they graduate from the Indonesian Army War College.
In the future, the Indonesian Army War College will need some improvements in terms of organization, the sources of the students and possibility to get a Masters degree in affiliation with one of the prominent universities in Indonesia. The students will not only come from the Army but also from the Navy, Air Force or civilians. The civilians will need some more time to reach the required level before they can join the course.
Improve the Indonesian and US Army relationship
In previous years, Indonesia and the US had a very good relationship. This relationship deteriorated after President Suharto resigned in 1998. The unstable political situation and accusation of human rights abuses made the relationship more difficult. The US government cut all training and education programs for the Indonesian officers. Even though the military-to-military relationship sank to zero, other personal relationships continued and waited for the right moment to emerge. When the 911 tragedy happened, Indonesia’s president was the first head of state sending its condolences. Soon, a good relationship between the two countries was restored.
The Indonesian and US Army relationship is now back on track. Although not all the training was given back to Indonesia, the speed of the recovery was marvelous. We tried to create another approach, not only in the form of training and education but also in the form of military sales. Lots of military equipment that was embargoed by the US government is now easily delivered to Indonesia.
Maintaining and improving the already good relationship is our task in the future. The US Army as the strongest army in the world will need to have a friend in the biggest Moslem country. The training and education between the two countries will create a mutual benefit. If we are able to nurture it carefully, we will see in the future the mutual respect not only between the two armies but also between the two nations.
On the professional side, in addition to what was already mention, studies in the US Army War College would also preparing me for my the future job in the Indonesian Army. By studying here, I am sure I’ll be ready to work in the multinational staff environment. Sure, I also will get benefits from the strategic program for my own personal improvement.
Personal Goals
Physical Training
At the US Army War College, I would have a good opportunity to do my physical training. It is difficult for me to arrange such a schedule when I was in Jakarta. I plan to have a good workout in the gym, at the same time I enjoy the new rhythm of my life staying at Carlisle Barracks. I really look forward to bringing my body back to good shape like when I was a Captain.
I never imagined that while staying here, I would undergo a total medical check up. I know up to now, I never had a problem with my health. However, I felt a little bit nervous when I got information that the medical check up can predict my health status in the next 5 years based on my present condition. All in all, I am not afraid with my medical check up results, because I am sure this year will become the most precious year in my life.
So, when I get the medical check up results, I will be able to create my own schedule for the physical training completely with the diet program from the expert at the Army War College. I will lose some weight if I follow the instructions closely, and next June at graduation day I will be healthier than June this year.
Academics
I am always asking myself, “What do I want to accomplish on the academic side this year?” I want to explore national security issues to prepare for my future job as a national security expert. In the same time, I want to improve my understanding in the international perspective of culture, economics, politics and their relationship.
As an army officer, I also want to increase my knowledge regarding sister services in order to understand their structure and employment. I also want to enhance my understanding of joint operation forces in the multinational environment.
Family life
This year at Carlisle is a good chance for me to reestablish my relationship with my wife and my son. I had already asked my wife to attend the activities provided by the International Fellows Office, such as the English as Second Language Course and the Conversation and Cultural Club. Everyday, she always tells me the program and the progress she has made; she looks like she enjoys it very much.
My son will go to 9th grade this year. He looks so excited for his new school. Although his school is far from our house, I am not worried because they have a pick up and drop off vehicle which stops right in front of our house. He speaks very good English. No wonder he already made lots of friends and is playing around with his bike.
Multinational Environments
The first day I came to the Army War College, I realized that I would be exposed to the multinational environment. My prediction was correct because I met other foreign students from a total of 42 different countries. We went through the orientation program, including some cultural trips to Hershey’s and Washington DC. It did not take a long time for us to get along, and the relationship between foreign officers had become very close like a big family.
My daily life in Carlisle seems so simple, but it’s really in a multicultural environment. The housing area where we live is comprised of several different countries: to the left is Morocco and to the right is Qatar. The Mongolian, Georgian and Iraqis stay together in the same block right in front of us. It is not surprising that I have improved my English very fast, even my wife and my son are now able to speak English fluently.
A good chance to take a break
Staying one year in Carlisle means I will be off from the routine work I usually have. The whole activity here is totally different. It looks like I have a privilege to recharge my battery. I will use this year wisely, contemplate where my position is now, and try to reflect where my next position is.
It is clear that in order to achieve my professional and personal goals, I need to work hard. I really need to create a good balance between professional goals and personal goals. On one hand, are these professional goals: improve the Indonesian Army, improve the Indonesian Army War College, improve the Indonesian-US Army relationship and prepare for my future job. These will become my cornerstone. On the other hand, are my personal goals: physical training, academics, family life, exposure to the broader multicultural environment and a good chance to take a break. These will be too precious to be ignored. However, I predict that I will be able to achieve these goals based on my observation that I have plenty of good faculty and officers in my seminar.
Col Imam Edy Mulyono
Indonesia
MY GOALS IN THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
COL IMAM EDY MULYONO
SEMINAR 13/ USAWC AY 08
For nine weeks in Carlisle, I have thought about my goals while I study at the Army War College (AWC). I came here with my wife and my son. This is my third time attending a course in the USA, but it’s the first time for my family to come to the USA. Our Carlile Barrack’s sponsor picked us up at Harrisburg Airport and took us to Day’s Inn Hotel. We stayed three days in this hotel before we found a rental apartment close to the post. The first seven weeks, we had an orientation program with 42 other officers from different countries, and this last two weeks we split into seminar groups mixing with the US officers. Despite the busy activities in the orientation programs and our new seminar, there are two areas with goals I will try to focus on, professional and personal.
Professional Goals
Improve the Indonesian Army
I want to improve the Indonesian Army as a payback for what the army had already given me these last 27 years. I noticed several fields that I can improve when I go back to Indonesia. Of course, I will make some adjustments to make it applicable, but I will focus on organization, recruitment and civilians in the military.
The Indonesian Army organization now is in a great need to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in order to be able to cope with the current threat. It is a legacy of the Cold War whose structure and dislocation is based on the threat perception from that time. The rapid deployment forces must be ready to move to at least two different troubled spots on short notice. The forces should be restructured and moved closer to the predicted location, so the troubled spots can be contained giving sufficient time for the main forces to prepare to crush the enemy. The Indonesian Army also needs to spend money smarter. It must conduct thorough evaluation in all administration aspects, including how to control the money spent for housing allowances, how to eliminate dedicated vehicles for the officers and how to eliminate the unnecessary personal assistants.
We also need to improve the recruitment method in the Indonesia Army. What we have now is very orthodox. The recruitment location is in the military office and it’s open for a limited time only. In order to get the best candidate, it would be better if the recruitment locations were also placed in the malls, bus stations, airports or other busy places which attract the youth. The recruitment personnel also need to put advertisements in all available media, such as television, magazines, billboards and newspapers.
To improve the army, we also need committed civilians working in the military unit. Officially, civilians are complementary for the military. But in reality, the military feels it difficult to accept the civilian. So, we have to introduce a new culture working together hand in hand. On the military side, they must be ready to accept the civilian and put them in suitable positions, while on the civilian side, they must be able to show their capability and commitment, and at the same time, learn the army culture.
Improve Indonesian Army War College
The Indonesian Army War College inaugural class began this year. The first batch of officers started in March. The Command and General Staff College has the responsibility to run the course and to prepare the faculty. Most of the lectures come from guest speakers from different institutions. The students are comprised of senior colonels or junior flag officers. All of these officers are projected to get their promotion soon after they graduate from the Indonesian Army War College.
In the future, the Indonesian Army War College will need some improvements in terms of organization, the sources of the students and possibility to get a Masters degree in affiliation with one of the prominent universities in Indonesia. The students will not only come from the Army but also from the Navy, Air Force or civilians. The civilians will need some more time to reach the required level before they can join the course.
Improve the Indonesian and US Army relationship
In previous years, Indonesia and the US had a very good relationship. This relationship deteriorated after President Suharto resigned in 1998. The unstable political situation and accusation of human rights abuses made the relationship more difficult. The US government cut all training and education programs for the Indonesian officers. Even though the military-to-military relationship sank to zero, other personal relationships continued and waited for the right moment to emerge. When the 911 tragedy happened, Indonesia’s president was the first head of state sending its condolences. Soon, a good relationship between the two countries was restored.
The Indonesian and US Army relationship is now back on track. Although not all the training was given back to Indonesia, the speed of the recovery was marvelous. We tried to create another approach, not only in the form of training and education but also in the form of military sales. Lots of military equipment that was embargoed by the US government is now easily delivered to Indonesia.
Maintaining and improving the already good relationship is our task in the future. The US Army as the strongest army in the world will need to have a friend in the biggest Moslem country. The training and education between the two countries will create a mutual benefit. If we are able to nurture it carefully, we will see in the future the mutual respect not only between the two armies but also between the two nations.
On the professional side, in addition to what was already mention, studies in the US Army War College would also preparing me for my the future job in the Indonesian Army. By studying here, I am sure I’ll be ready to work in the multinational staff environment. Sure, I also will get benefits from the strategic program for my own personal improvement.
Personal Goals
Physical Training
At the US Army War College, I would have a good opportunity to do my physical training. It is difficult for me to arrange such a schedule when I was in Jakarta. I plan to have a good workout in the gym, at the same time I enjoy the new rhythm of my life staying at Carlisle Barracks. I really look forward to bringing my body back to good shape like when I was a Captain.
I never imagined that while staying here, I would undergo a total medical check up. I know up to now, I never had a problem with my health. However, I felt a little bit nervous when I got information that the medical check up can predict my health status in the next 5 years based on my present condition. All in all, I am not afraid with my medical check up results, because I am sure this year will become the most precious year in my life.
So, when I get the medical check up results, I will be able to create my own schedule for the physical training completely with the diet program from the expert at the Army War College. I will lose some weight if I follow the instructions closely, and next June at graduation day I will be healthier than June this year.
Academics
I am always asking myself, “What do I want to accomplish on the academic side this year?” I want to explore national security issues to prepare for my future job as a national security expert. In the same time, I want to improve my understanding in the international perspective of culture, economics, politics and their relationship.
As an army officer, I also want to increase my knowledge regarding sister services in order to understand their structure and employment. I also want to enhance my understanding of joint operation forces in the multinational environment.
Family life
This year at Carlisle is a good chance for me to reestablish my relationship with my wife and my son. I had already asked my wife to attend the activities provided by the International Fellows Office, such as the English as Second Language Course and the Conversation and Cultural Club. Everyday, she always tells me the program and the progress she has made; she looks like she enjoys it very much.
My son will go to 9th grade this year. He looks so excited for his new school. Although his school is far from our house, I am not worried because they have a pick up and drop off vehicle which stops right in front of our house. He speaks very good English. No wonder he already made lots of friends and is playing around with his bike.
Multinational Environments
The first day I came to the Army War College, I realized that I would be exposed to the multinational environment. My prediction was correct because I met other foreign students from a total of 42 different countries. We went through the orientation program, including some cultural trips to Hershey’s and Washington DC. It did not take a long time for us to get along, and the relationship between foreign officers had become very close like a big family.
My daily life in Carlisle seems so simple, but it’s really in a multicultural environment. The housing area where we live is comprised of several different countries: to the left is Morocco and to the right is Qatar. The Mongolian, Georgian and Iraqis stay together in the same block right in front of us. It is not surprising that I have improved my English very fast, even my wife and my son are now able to speak English fluently.
A good chance to take a break
Staying one year in Carlisle means I will be off from the routine work I usually have. The whole activity here is totally different. It looks like I have a privilege to recharge my battery. I will use this year wisely, contemplate where my position is now, and try to reflect where my next position is.
It is clear that in order to achieve my professional and personal goals, I need to work hard. I really need to create a good balance between professional goals and personal goals. On one hand, are these professional goals: improve the Indonesian Army, improve the Indonesian Army War College, improve the Indonesian-US Army relationship and prepare for my future job. These will become my cornerstone. On the other hand, are my personal goals: physical training, academics, family life, exposure to the broader multicultural environment and a good chance to take a break. These will be too precious to be ignored. However, I predict that I will be able to achieve these goals based on my observation that I have plenty of good faculty and officers in my seminar.
Col Imam Edy Mulyono
Indonesia
MY GOALS IN THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
COL IMAM EDY MULYONO
SEMINAR 13/ USAWC AY 08
The Uniformed Intellectual in Indonesia
The Uniformed Intellectual in Indonesia
The Indonesian Armed Forces was a very unique in the sense that it was established not by the government, but the military created itself from the members of militia trained by the Japanese. At that time, the new government under President Sukarno reluctant to raise an army, because it wanted to achieve independence peacefully (Salim Said, Suharto’s Armed Forces, Sinar Harapan ;2006). The consequences of the government reluctance forced the military to elect its own Armed Forces Commander. The man elected was Sudirman, a former schoolteacher turned battalion commander during the Japanese period. This essay will try to elaborate the role of the intellectual officers in Indonesia.
General Sudirman, after resuming his power as Armed Forces Commander, recognizing the authority of President Sukarno as political leadership, the most interesting is he saw himself not as merely government soldier but also as guardian of the nation. The army could not develop himself as it did if not because of the weakness of political and governmental institution at that time. This situation in one hand caused the government to lose control of the military, but in other hand also convinced the officers to pursue their own policy.
The guerilla war following the Dutch attack on 19 December 1948, gave Sudirman the opportunity to demonstrate the autonomy of the army. Its clearly showed when the political leadership decided to surrender to the Dutch, Sudirman and his forces when to the jungle to fight a guerilla war. The intellectual officer behind this guerilla war was Colonel A.H. Nasution, his own deputy and recognized as a bright officer. At that time, he reorganized the army into two forces, the mobile forces and the territorial forces. He also prepared the people to engage in a total war.
There were two prominent figures in this period, namely Col A.H.Nasution and Col T.B. Simatupang. Both of them Dutch-educated officers. These two intellectual officers tried to reorganize TNI into modern forces, but the failed because the Japanese trained officers refused the plan. Subsequently they lost their jobs.
Those situation up to now still the same. The intellectual officers who want to apply his capability faces that kind of dilemma. If he wants to follow the path of the Doers, he has a possibility to be selected as Battalion Commander or even move to higher command. But he never have chance to exercise his intellectual capability. If he tries to apply his intellectual capability he will ended his career as instructor in the military academy or in the CGSC as directing staff.
How the intellectual officers find the way to reach the top? In this modern and globalization era they cleverly pretended as the Doers while they climb the ladder up to Colonel Rank. They showed their capability in the field in order to get the acceptability from the senior officer. When they reach the star, no one can stop him, because actually in the officers’ corps everyone put the high respect for the intellectual officers. It’s difficult to accept intellectual officers if they never joint the muddy-boots forces. To avoid the young intellectual officer wilted before it fully grow, usually the senior intellectual officer mentoring him to make sure no one put stigma on him as mere theorist . He also will follow the path joining the muddy-boots to get his Colonel before he fully develops his capability.
There are a lot of example intellectual officers who reach their stars, retired and now work in the think tank institution. To mention a few, LTG Agus Wijoyo, MG Simbolon or even Indonesia Presiden Susilo B. Yudhoyono. The typical acceptable intellectual officer in Indonesia; he must show that in his track record he has assignment in the unit, notorious operation or special task which put life at risk. He also must accept that every changing in the army structure or organization must be conducted gradually. It is very sad to mention, that a lonely intellectual officer – LTG Agus WHK – was pass away with out enough coverage. He tried hard to modernized the army but he had chosen the radical way in 2001. The result ? He lost his job as Kostrad Commanding Officer, the prestigious three star positions in TNI. He spend his rest of life writing a book and before the retired age came, he passed away.
To conclude, in Indonesia intellectual officer and the doers always get along in the same direction. The important to remember that he must serve with the unit as muddy-boots from the young officer till the middle rank. The other important lesson is that all the modernization, reformation or transformation in the army must be conducted in gradual way.
Col Imam Edy Mulyono
The Indonesian Armed Forces was a very unique in the sense that it was established not by the government, but the military created itself from the members of militia trained by the Japanese. At that time, the new government under President Sukarno reluctant to raise an army, because it wanted to achieve independence peacefully (Salim Said, Suharto’s Armed Forces, Sinar Harapan ;2006). The consequences of the government reluctance forced the military to elect its own Armed Forces Commander. The man elected was Sudirman, a former schoolteacher turned battalion commander during the Japanese period. This essay will try to elaborate the role of the intellectual officers in Indonesia.
General Sudirman, after resuming his power as Armed Forces Commander, recognizing the authority of President Sukarno as political leadership, the most interesting is he saw himself not as merely government soldier but also as guardian of the nation. The army could not develop himself as it did if not because of the weakness of political and governmental institution at that time. This situation in one hand caused the government to lose control of the military, but in other hand also convinced the officers to pursue their own policy.
The guerilla war following the Dutch attack on 19 December 1948, gave Sudirman the opportunity to demonstrate the autonomy of the army. Its clearly showed when the political leadership decided to surrender to the Dutch, Sudirman and his forces when to the jungle to fight a guerilla war. The intellectual officer behind this guerilla war was Colonel A.H. Nasution, his own deputy and recognized as a bright officer. At that time, he reorganized the army into two forces, the mobile forces and the territorial forces. He also prepared the people to engage in a total war.
There were two prominent figures in this period, namely Col A.H.Nasution and Col T.B. Simatupang. Both of them Dutch-educated officers. These two intellectual officers tried to reorganize TNI into modern forces, but the failed because the Japanese trained officers refused the plan. Subsequently they lost their jobs.
Those situation up to now still the same. The intellectual officers who want to apply his capability faces that kind of dilemma. If he wants to follow the path of the Doers, he has a possibility to be selected as Battalion Commander or even move to higher command. But he never have chance to exercise his intellectual capability. If he tries to apply his intellectual capability he will ended his career as instructor in the military academy or in the CGSC as directing staff.
How the intellectual officers find the way to reach the top? In this modern and globalization era they cleverly pretended as the Doers while they climb the ladder up to Colonel Rank. They showed their capability in the field in order to get the acceptability from the senior officer. When they reach the star, no one can stop him, because actually in the officers’ corps everyone put the high respect for the intellectual officers. It’s difficult to accept intellectual officers if they never joint the muddy-boots forces. To avoid the young intellectual officer wilted before it fully grow, usually the senior intellectual officer mentoring him to make sure no one put stigma on him as mere theorist . He also will follow the path joining the muddy-boots to get his Colonel before he fully develops his capability.
There are a lot of example intellectual officers who reach their stars, retired and now work in the think tank institution. To mention a few, LTG Agus Wijoyo, MG Simbolon or even Indonesia Presiden Susilo B. Yudhoyono. The typical acceptable intellectual officer in Indonesia; he must show that in his track record he has assignment in the unit, notorious operation or special task which put life at risk. He also must accept that every changing in the army structure or organization must be conducted gradually. It is very sad to mention, that a lonely intellectual officer – LTG Agus WHK – was pass away with out enough coverage. He tried hard to modernized the army but he had chosen the radical way in 2001. The result ? He lost his job as Kostrad Commanding Officer, the prestigious three star positions in TNI. He spend his rest of life writing a book and before the retired age came, he passed away.
To conclude, in Indonesia intellectual officer and the doers always get along in the same direction. The important to remember that he must serve with the unit as muddy-boots from the young officer till the middle rank. The other important lesson is that all the modernization, reformation or transformation in the army must be conducted in gradual way.
Col Imam Edy Mulyono
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)